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Abstract
We reconsider a well known problem of quantum theory, i.e. the so
called measurement (or macro-objectification) problem, and we red-
erive the fact that it gives rise to serious problems of interpretation.
The novelty of our approach derives from the fact that the relevant
conclusion is obtained in a completely general way, in particular, with-
out resorting to any of the assumptions of ideality which are usually
done for the measurement process. The generality and unescapability
of our assumptions (we take into account possible malfunctionings of
the apparatus, its unavoidable entanglement with the environmment,
its high but not absolute reliability, its fundamentally uncontrollable
features) allow to draw the conclusion that the very possibility of per-
forming measurements on a microsystem combined with the assumed
general validity of the linear nature of quantum evolution leads to a
fundamental contradiction.
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1 Introduction
In most of the treatises on the foundations of Quantum Mechanics, when
discussing the measurement problem and its possible solutions, the authors
make use of the von Neumann scheme for an ideal measurement process [1]
since, due to its simplicity, it allows to grasp immediately why the standard
solution to such a problem is not satisfactory. The von Neumann argument
goes as follows.
Consider a microscopic system S and one of its observables O. Let on
be its eigenvalues (we suppose the spectrum of O to be purely discrete and
non–degenerate), and |on〉 the corresponding eigenvectors.
Let us call M the apparatus devised to measure the observable O of the
microsystem S. One supposes that M has a ready–state |M0〉, i.e. a state
in which the apparatus is ready to measure the considered property, plus a
set of mutually orthogonal states |Mn〉 (and orthogonal to the ready–state),
which correspond to different macroscopic configurations of the instrument,
like different positions of a pointer along a scale.
Finally, one assumes that the interaction between the microsystem S and
the apparatus M is linear (since the Schro¨dinger equation is supposed to
govern all natural processes) and that it yields a perfect correlation between
the initial state of S and the final state of the apparatus, i.e.
Initial state: |on〉 ⊗ |M0〉 −→ Final state: |on〉 ⊗ |Mn〉; (1.1)
in this way one is sure that, if the final state of the apparatus is |Mn〉 (i.e.
the pointer, for example, is in the n–th position along the scale), he can say
that the state of the particle is |on〉, and that the observable O has the value
on.
Within such a context, the measurement problem arises when the initial
state of the particle, previous to the measurement, is not just one of the
vectors |on〉 like in eq. (1.1), but a superposition of them, for example:
|m+ l〉 = 1√
2
[|om〉+ |ol〉].
In this case, due to the linearity of the quantum evolution, the final state of
the microsystem+apparatus is given by:
|m+ l〉 ⊗ |M0〉 = 1√
2
[|om〉+ |ol〉]⊗ |M0〉 −→
2
−→ 1√
2
[|om〉 ⊗ |Mm〉+ |ol〉 ⊗ |Ml〉]. (1.2)
This final state is an entangled state of the microscopic system and of the
apparatus, and it is well known that (if one assumes that the theory is com-
plete, i.e., that the wave–function contains all the information about the
system) in the considered case it is not even in principle legitimate to state
that the properties associated to the states |Mm〉 or |Ml〉 are possessed by
the apparatus (the same holds true for the microsystem): as a consequence,
the apparatus is not in any macroscopic definite configuration. This is the
essence of the quantum measurement problem.
The standard way out from this difficulty is given by the so–called wave–
packet reduction postulate, which states that “at the end of the measurement
process” the final vector in (1.2) reduces to one of its terms
|om〉 ⊗ |Mm〉 or |ol〉 ⊗ |Ml〉,
with a probability given by the square modulus of the coefficient associated
to that term (1/2 for both outcomes, in our example).
It is obvious that the postulate of wave–packet reduction contradicts
the general validity of the Schro¨dinger equation and consequently it does
not represent a satisfactory solution to the measurement problem. Accord-
ingly, many other (more or less satisfactory) solutions have been proposed
[2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. In spite of this, various people [8, 7, 9] have suggested that the
problem does not derive from the structure of quantum mechanics (in partic-
ular from the linear character of the quantum evolution), or from the wave–
packet reduction postulate, but from adopting the over–simplified model of
the measurement process put forward by von Neumann. If one takes into
account a more realistic model, they argue, the measurement problem would
turn into a false one, and there would be no need to modify the interpretation
of Quantum Mechanics, or to put forward a new theory.
In particular, the following assumptions have been criticized:
• That the measuring apparatus can be prepared in a precise state |M0〉:
since the instrument is a macroscopic object with many degrees of
freedom, it is impossible to know its precise state at any given time.
• That one can safely neglect the interactions between the apparatus
and the surrounding environment. In fact, the interaction with the
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environment (which is referred to as decoherence) produces essentially
a randomization of the phases associated to the different components of
the wave–function, a process which can be seen as an apparent collapse
of the wave–function into one of these components.
• That the final states of the apparatus, corresponding to perceptively
different macroscopic configurations of the apparatus itself, are orthog-
onal: actually, different states usually correspond to different positions
of some component of the instrument, and since no wave–function can
have compact support in configuration space (because of the quantum
evolution), wave–functions corresponding to different states cannot, in
general, be orthogonal.
• That the final state of the apparatus gets perfectly correlated to the
initial state of the microscopic system: this is an highly idealized char-
acteristic which is not shared by any realistic physical instrument.
Just to give some examples of the above situation, we consider it ap-
propriate to mention explicitly some statements by distinguished physicists,
supporting the idea that the measurement problem is a false one:
1. H. Primas, during a conference in Finland [7], has stated:
... the measurement problem of quantum mechanics as it is dis-
cussed by theoreticians and philosophers is an extremely ill posed
problem ... Measurements of the first kind are unrealistic and
completely irrelevant for experimental science ... Replace in all
textbooks and philosophical treatises on quantum mechanics the
word ‘measurement’ by the proper expression ‘measurement of
the first kind’ and add a footnote: measurements of the first kind
are idealizations which never play any role in experimental sci-
ence.
In this article we will prove rigorously that also when consideration
is given to very reasonable and realistic schemes of measurement pro-
cesses, the problem cannot be avoided. As a consequence, Primas’
statements are not pertinent.
2. In an article appeared in Physics Today [8], W. Zurek claims that,
because of the interaction with the environment, the
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... coherent superposition of ... states [like those of eq. (1.2)] ...
is continuously reduced to a mixture. A preferred basis of the
detector, sometimes called a “pointer basis”, has been singled
out ... Decoherence prevents superpositions of the preferred basis
states from persisting.
Despite what Zurek claims, it is well known that decoherence, by it-
self, does not “prevent superpositions of the preferred basis states from
persisting”, and the theorem we will prove in this paper will show that
Zurek’s conclusions are incorrect.
3. In a quite recent book [9], some of the authors (whose conceptual po-
sition with respect decoherence is slightly different from the one of
refs. [7,8]) seem to consider decoherence a satisfactory explanation of
why ordinary macroscopic objects appear to behave classically. For ex-
ample, in Section 8.3 where decoherence and spontaneous localization
models [2] are compared, we find it written:
... stochastic collapse models may be an interesting concept for
the purpose of illustrating and discussing the measurement prob-
lem in quantum theory, but there seems to be no phenomeno-
logical necessity for its introduction, neither in connection with
the appearance of classical properties (for which environmen-
tal decoherence already provides a satisfactory explanation), nor
prompted by new phenomena.
We stress again that decoherence does not represent by itself a solution
to the macro–objectification problem in general, and to the measure-
ment problem in particular: only if one adopts a precise interpretation
(like bohmian mechanics, decoherent histories, ...), decoherence can be
of help in solving these problems. Unfortunately, all the above au-
thors forget to inform us of the interpretation they adopt (which, of
course, cannot be the standard one, since it includes the postulate of
wave–packet reduction which, as we have said, is contradictory).
As we have already mentioned, in this paper we will consider a completely
general and realistic model for the measurement process, and we will show
that superpositions of different macroscopic configurations of macro–objects
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cannot be avoided within a strict quantum mechanical scheme. Correspond-
ingly, the appearence of macroscopic situations which are incompatible with
our definite perceptions about the objects of our experience is inescapable.
This “empasse” can only be eliminated either by adopting a precise and
unambiguous interpretation which differs from the orthodox one, or by mod-
ifying the theory itself1.
2 The Microscopic System
Let us start our general discussion of the measurement process by analyzing
the microscopic system whose properties we want to measure; we consider
for simplicity the simplest system upon which non–trivial measurements can
be performed, i.e. a system (S) whose associated Hilbert space (HS) is
two–dimensional — like the one describing the spin of an electron, or the
polarization states of a photon — and we consider an observable O having
two different eigenvalues; let us call |u〉 and |d〉 the eigenstates associated to
these eigenvalues. For definiteness, we will consider a single such system and
we will call “spin” its degree of freedom; we will say that the particle has
“spin Up” when it is in state |u〉, and that it has “spin Down” when it is
in state |d〉. Besides these two states, also their superpositions can be taken
into account, like for example:
|u + d〉 = 1√
2
[ |u〉 + |d〉 ],
a vector describing a new state, “spin Up + spin Down”, of the particle.
Without any loss of generality, we will assume that, by resorting to appro-
priate procedures, one can “prepare” the system S in any one of the above
considered states.
We remark that we could have considered more general physical systems,
like compound ones, and observables having a more complicated spectrum
(e.g. the continuos spectrum of position). Anyway, in accordance with the
generally accepted position that microsystems can be prepared in a precise
1An explicit proof that releasing the request of an ideal measurement does not allow to
circumvent the measurement problem can be found in the well known book by d’Espagnat
[10]; however, his proof is much more complex and much less general than the one we are
going to present here.
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quantum state and with the (nowadays) common experimental practice to
handle single particles and to measure their (discrete) spin (or polarization,
in the case of photons) states, we have chosen to work with very simple
microsystems as the one we are considering here. Moreover, we also assume
that, after the preparation, the system is in a precise and known state, and
that it can be treated as isolated from the rest of the world, at least untill the
measurement process begins2. We stress that if one denies these assumptions
it is not clear what he takes quantum theory to be about.
3 The Measuring Apparatus
A measuring apparatus is a macroscopic system which, interacting with the
microsystem whose properties one is interested in ascertaining, ends up into
a state more or less correlated with the eigenstates of the observable it is
devised to measure. The different possible outcomes of the measurement are
supposed to be correlated to perceptively different macroscopic configurations
of a part of the apparatus, e.g. different positions of the pointer (for analogic
instruments), different numbers on a display (for digital ones), different spots
on a photographic plate, different plots on a screen, and so on. For simplicity,
in what follows we will assume that the apparatus has a pointer movable along
a scale, whose position registers the result of the measurement.
Contrary to microsystems, the measuring apparatus, being a macroscopic
object, has many degrees of freedom, most of which — in particular the
microscopic ones — we cannot control at all; and of the macroscopic ones,
like the position of the pointer, we can have only a very limited control.
Moreover, the apparatus, due to its dimensions, is always interacting with the
environment (whose degrees of freedom are also essentially out of control).
Following this line of reasoning, one can remark that the apparatus — or
at least its constituents — existed quite a long before the measurement is
performed, so it had all the time to interact (even if only weakly) with a large
part of the universe, or perhaps with all of it. All these interactions make,
to a large extent, unknown and uncontrollable the state of the macroscopic
systems which enters into play. In spite of this difficulty, in order to keep our
2In mathematical terms, we assume that, prior to the measurement process, the wave–
function of the universe factorizes into the wave–function of the particle times the wave–
function of the rest of the world.
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analysis as general as possible, we will take them all into account.
According to the above discussion, we should, in general, speak of different
situations of the “whole universe”, even though our “reading” refers only
to the degrees of freedom of the pointer; accordingly, we shall indicate the
statevectors we will deal with in the following way:
|A α〉.
These vectors belong to the Hilbert space associated to the apparatus, the
environment, and in the most general case to the whole universe. A is a label
which indicates that the pointer of the apparatus is in a specific macroscopic
configuration, i.e. one which we perceive and we identify with a specific
position along the scale. In first approximation, we could say that A is
essentially the value x characterizing the “projection operator” |x〉〈x| (|x〉
being an “improper” statevector of the Hilbert space of the pointer) giving
the exact position of (e.g., the centre of mass of) the pointer along the scale.
But it is evident that no system can be prepared in such a state (since it is
impossible to measure a continuous variable with a perfect accuracy); and
even if it were possible to do so, the hamiltonian evolution would immediately
change that state: thus the pointer cannot ever be in an eigenstate of |x〉〈x|.
We could try to improve our model by taking into account not precise
positions along the scale, but small intervals ∆(x) = [x − δ, x + δ], and
claiming that “the pointer is at position x” when the wave–function is an
eigenstate of the projection operator which projects onto the interval3 ∆(x)
of the position of the centre of mass. If one takes such a position, the label
A characterizing our general state |A α〉 refers to any wave–function having
such a property, of course with the interval ∆(x) replaced by the interval
∆(A): as a consequence, for the considered state we can claim that “the
pointer is at position A”. However, also this approach is not viable since the
hamiltonian evolution transforms any wave–function with compact support
into a wave–function with a non–compact one; this fact gives rise to what
has sometimes been called the “tail problem”, a problem which cannot be
avoided, and which renders rather delicate the task of making precise the idea
of “an object being somewhere” within a quantum mechanical framework.
3Of course, here we are considering for simplicity a one–dimensional situation; the
argument can be easily generalized to the three–dimensional case.
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In the light of the above discussion, we consider a very general physical
situation: we will call VA the set of all (normalized) vectors |A α〉 for which
we are allowed to say that “the pointer of the apparatus is at position A” or,
stated differently, that “the universe is in a configuration which we perceive
as one corresponding to the statement: the pointer is at A”. We do not
put any restriction to the vectors belonging to VA: they can represent wave–
functions with or without tails, more or less localized in space, and so on;
we do not even resort to projection operators to characterize these states.
The only physical requirement we put forward is that, if the pointer admits
two macroscopically different positions along the scale (let us call them A
and B), then any two vectors corresponding to such different configurations
must be “almost orthogonal”. This requirement can be translated into the
following mathematical relation: denoting as VB the set of all normalized
vectors corresponding to the statement “the pointer is at B” while VA, as
before, contains all the vectors corresponding to the statement “the pointer
is at A”, we must have:
inf
|A α〉 ∈ VA
|B β〉 ∈ VB
‖|A α〉 − |B β〉‖ ≥
√
2− η η ≪ 1, (3.1)
i.e. the minimum distance between the vectors of the two above sets can-
not differ too much from
√
2, which is the distance between two orthogonal
normalized states. We recall that the orthogonality request of the standard
measurement theory is done to be sure to be dealing with strictly mutually
exclusive situations. Obviously such a request can be partially released (as
we are doing here) but not given up completely if one wants to be able to
“read” the outcome in a fundamentally non ambiguous way. It is evident
that (3.1) is a necessary requirement if one pretends that different macro-
scopic positions of the pointer (and of any other system) represent mutually
exclusive configurations of the object4.
Let us now comment on the second parameter α characterizing our states:
4Obviously, here we are making reference to a genuinely quantum description (with the
completeness assumption). In alternative interpretations or formulations of the theory,
orthogonality is not necessary to guarantee macroscopic differences. Tipically, in hid-
den variables theories one could have non orthogonal wave–functions and different values
for the hidden variables such that the associated physical situations are macroscopically
different.
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this is an index which takes into account all other degrees of freedom that
are out of control5; thus, two vectors labeled by A, but with different values
for α, refer to the “same” macroscopic configuration for the pointer (or, in
general, of the “part of the universe we perceive”), while they describe two
different states for the rest of the universe (e.g., given a certain atom of the
pointer, it might be in the ground state when the state is |A α〉, while it
might be in an excited state when it is |A β〉).
Since the microscopic particle has two spin–states, if we want to use the
apparatus to distinguish them we have to assume that the pointer admits
at least two macroscopically different positions (U and D) along the scale6;
the previous argument requires to assume that there exist two sets VU and
VD: the first one contains all the vectors corresponding to the situation in
which the ponter can be said to point at “U”, while the second set contains
all those vectors associated to the statement “the pointer is at D”. Moreover,
these two sets must be almost orthogonal in the sense of (3.1):
inf
|U α〉 ∈ VU
|D β〉 ∈ VD
‖|U α〉 − |D β〉‖ ≥
√
2− η η ≪ 1, (3.2)
One interesting property of VU and VD (which is shared by any couple of
sets satisiyng (3.2)) is that they have no vectors in common: in fact, it is
easy to see that if VU and VD had such a common vector, then the minimum
distance between them would be zero, a fact which would contradict (3.2).
From the physical point of view, this property is obvious since a vector be-
longing both to VU and to VD would be a vector for which we could claim
both that “the pointer points at U” and that “the pointer points at D”,
a contradictory situation since “U” and “D” correspond to macroscopically
different situations.
5From the mathematical point of view, α stands for the eigenvalues of a complete set
of commuting observables for the whole universe, exception made for the position of the
pointer.
6The idea is that, if we perform the measurement and we find the pointer in the position
labeled by U , then we can claim the “the result of the measurement is that the spin of
the particle is Up”; similarly, if we find the pointer in D, then we can say that “the spin
of the particle is Down”.
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4 The Preparation of the Apparatus
A measuring instrument must be prepared before one performs a measure-
ment, i.e. one has to arrange the apparatus in such a way that it is ready to
interact with the microscopic system and give a result; following the discus-
sion of the previous section, it is evident that the initial state–vector must
carry an index α which takes into account the state of the rest of the uni-
verse: accordingly, we will denote the initial state–vector as |A0 α〉, where
A0 indicates that the pointer “is” in the ready (A0) state.
Anyway, we remember that, besides the measuring instrument, we have
also to prepare the microsystem in a precise state, and moreover we have
assumed that after the preparation and immediately before the measurement
process, the microsystem itself is isolated from the rest of the universe; the
initial state–vector for the whole universe can then be written as:
|A0 α〉 = |spin〉 ⊗ |A0 α〉,
where α specifies the state of the whole universe, with the exception of the
initial state of the micro–particle and the initial “position” of the pointer;
|spin〉 is the initial state–vector of the particle.
Obviously, also in the process of preparing the apparatus we cannot con-
trol the state of the universe so that we do not know the precise initial state
|A0 α〉: in fact, in any specific situation any value for the index α will occur
with a given probability p(α), which in general is unknown to us — but,
of course, it has to satisfy appropriate requirements we will discuss in what
follows. Accordingly, the initial setup, for the apparatus and the microscopic
particle, will be described as follows:
Initial Setup = { |spin〉 ⊗ |A0 α〉, p(α)} ,
where p(α) gives the probability distribution of the remaining, uncontrollable,
degrees of freedom.
5 The Measurement Process
If one assumes that Quantum Mechanics governs all physical systems, the
measurement process, being an interaction between two quantum systems,
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is governed by a unitary operator U(tI , tF ). Suppose the initial state of the
microsystem is |u〉 and the one of the apparatus (plus the rest of the universe)
is |A0 α〉; then, during the measurement, the whole universe evolves in the
following way:
|u〉 ⊗ |A0 α〉 −→ U(tI , tF ) [ |u〉 ⊗ |A0 α〉] = |F u α〉, (5.1)
while, if the initial state of the microsystem is |d〉, one has:
|d〉 ⊗ |A0 α〉 −→ U(tI , tF ) [ |d〉 ⊗ |A0 α〉] = |F d α〉. (5.2)
Some comments are needed.
• Note that in the above equations (5.1) and (5.2) the index α distin-
guishes various possible and uncontrollable situations of the measuring
apparatus in its “ready” state. Once the initial state is fully speci-
fied also the final one, being the evolution unitary, is perfectly and
unambiguously determined. Accordingly, such a state is appropriately
characterized by the same index α. Note also that, while the state
|A0 α〉 belongs to the Hilbert space of the whole universe exception
made for the micro–particle, the state |F d α〉 now includes also the
particle.
• Contrary to what one does in the ideal–measurement scheme of von
Neumann, we do not assume that the final state is factorized; thus, in
general
|F u α〉 6= |u〉 ⊗ |AU α〉.
• In particular, we do not suppose that the final state of the microsystem
be the same as the initial one: we allow the measurement process to
modify in a significant way the state of the particle; it could even
destroy the particle.
The only thing we require is that the measuring apparatus is reliable to
a high degree, i.e. that it can safely be used to measure the state of the
microsystem since, in most cases, it gives the correct answer. This means
that if the initial state of the microsystem (prior to the measurement) is |u〉,
then the final state |F u α〉 must belong in most of the cases to VU , while, if
the initial state of the particle is |d〉, then the final state |F d α〉 must almost
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always belong to VD. Note that by not requiring full reliability, we take into
account also the possibility that the measuring instrument gives the wrong
results, though pretending that such mistakes occur quite seldom.
It is possible to formalize the above reliability requests in the following
way. Let us consider the set K of all subsets J of the possible values that the
index α can assume and let us equip it with the following (natural) measure:
µ(J) =
∑
α∈J
p(α).
Let us also define the two following sets:
J−U = {α such that: |F u α〉 6∈ VU} ,
J−D = {α such that: |F d α〉 6∈ VD} .
J−
U
is the sets of all the indices α such that the states |F u α〉 do not cor-
respond to the outcome “the pointer is at position U”, despite the fact that
prior to the measurement the state of the particle was |u〉. Similarly, J−
D
cor-
responds to the states |F d α〉 for which we cannot claim that “the pointer
is in D”, even if the initial state of the system was |d〉. Let also J+
U
= CJ−
U
be the complement set of J−U , and J
+
D = CJ−D the complement of J−D .
Given this, the requirement that the instrument is reliable can be math-
ematically expressed in the following way:
µ(J−U ) ≤ ǫ µ(J−D) ≤ ǫ, ǫ≪ 1, (5.3)
i.e. the probability that the final position of the pointer does not match the
initial spin–value of the particle is very small, this smallness being controlled
by an appropriate parameter ǫ expressing the efficiency of the measuring
device and which, as such, can change (always remaining very small) with
the different actual measurement procedures one can devise.
Of course, it is easy to derive also limits on the measure for the comple-
ments of the above sets:
µ(J+
U
) ≥ 1− ǫ µ(J+
D
) ≥ 1− ǫ.
We need to take into account also the two sets: J− = J−U ∪ J−D and J+ =
CJ− = J+
U
∩ J+
D
; they satisfy the following relations:
µ(J−) ≤ 2ǫ µ(J+) ≥ 1− 2ǫ.
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Again, all these limits simply state that, being the apparatus reliable, the
probability that — at the end of the measurement process — the pointer is
not in the correct position is very small, if the initial state of the particle was
either |u〉 or |d〉.
It is useful to remark that, having taken into account the possibility that
the measuring instrument can make mistakes, we can easily include also the
possibility that it fails to interact at all with the microsystem, thus giving
no result: in such a case, the pointer remains in the “ready–state”, and
the corresponding vector belongs to the set J−. In fact, let us consider the
set V0 associated to the “ready–state”, as we did for the two sets VU and VD
referring to the “U” and “D” positions of the pointer. By the same argument
as before, V0 is disjoint from the two sets VU and VD, since the “ready–state”
is macroscopically different from the “U” and “D” states; consequently, if the
vector, at the end of the measuring process, belongs to V0, it cannot belong
either to VU or to VD.
We have mentioned the possibility that the apparatus misses to detect the
particle because such an occurrence affects (and in some case in an apprecia-
ble way) many experimental situations (e.g. the efficiency of photodetectors
is usually quite low). This does not pose any problem to our treatment: in
fact, we can easily circumvent this difficulty by simply disregarding (just as
it is common practice in actual experiments) all cases in which a detector
should register something but it doesn’t. The previous analysis and the sets
we have identified by precise mathematical criteria must then be read as re-
ferring exclusively to the cases in which the apparatuses register an outcome.
6 Proof of the Theorem
In the previous section we have reconsidered the measurement scheme, first
analyzed by von Neumann, and we have reformulated it on very general
grounds; in fact, the only requirements at the basis of our discussion are the
following two:
1. That the quantum evolution of any physical system is linear, since it
is governed by the Schro¨dinger equation;
2. That any two sets, like VU and VD, containing vectors corresponding
to different macroscopic configuration of a macro–object are almost
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orthogonal:
inf
|U α〉 ∈ VU
|D β〉 ∈ VD
‖|U α〉 − |D β〉‖ ≥
√
2− η η ≪ 1. (6.1)
We think that everybody would agree that any real measurement situation
(if it has to be described in quantum mechanical terms), shares these two
properties7.
Starting with these very simple premises we can now easily show that
quantum mechanics must face the problem of the occurrence of superposi-
tions of macroscopically different states of the apparatus, and in general of
a macro–system.
In our terms, the “measurement problem” arises (as usual) when the
initial spin–state of the particle is not |u〉 or |d〉, as we have considered in
the previous sections, but a superposition of them, like the state |u + d〉 of
section 2, which can be easily prepared in a laboratory. In such a case, due
to the linearity of the evolution, the final state of the particle+apparatus
system will be:
|u + d〉 ⊗ |A0 α〉 −→ U(tI , tF ) [ |u + d〉 ⊗ |A0 α〉] = |F u+d α〉
=
1√
2
[|F u α〉+ |F d α〉].
It is now very simple to prove that for each α belonging to J+, |F u+d α〉
cannot belong either to VU or to VD. In fact, let us suppose that it belongs to
VU (the proof in the case in which it is assumed to belong to VD is analogous);
since the distance between |F u+d α〉 and |F d α〉 is:
‖|F u+d α〉 − |F d α〉‖ = ‖1/
√
2 |F u α〉+
(
1/
√
2− 1
)
|F d α〉‖ ≤
≤ 1√
2
+ 1− 1√
2
= 1,
we get a contradiction, because |F u+d α〉 belongs to VU and |F d α〉 belongs
to VD, and relation (6.1) must hold between any two vectors of these two sets:
7As already remarked, request 2) can be violated in hidden variables theories. On the
other hand, request 1) is purposedly violated in dynamical reduction theories. Since both
theories account for the objectification of macroscopic properties, they must necessarily
violate one of the two requests.
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this proves that |F u+d α〉 cannot belong either to VU or to VD. Of course,
by the same argument, we can also prove that, for all α ∈ J+, the index
of the apparatus cannot be in any other macroscopic position different from
“U” and “D”.
We have shown that, for all α ∈ J+ and for all measurements processes
in which the apparatus registers an outcome, the vector |F u+d α〉 does
not allow to assign any macroscopic definite position to the index of the
apparatus, not even one different from “U” or “D”. Stated differently, the
large majority of the initial apparatus states, when they are triggered by
the superposition |u + d〉, end up in a state which does not correspond to
any definite position (in our geneal language of section 3, to any definite
situation of the part of the universe we perceive), i.e. one paralleling our
definite perceptions.
We believe that our formulation represents the most general proof of the
unavoidability of the macro-objectification problem: to have a consistent
picture one must accept that in a way or another the linear nature of the
dynamics must be broken. We are fully aware that such a conclusion is an old
one which is largely shared by those interested in the foundational aspects
of quantum mechanics. But we also think that our derivation of this result
is useful and interesting for the absolutely minimal (and physically unavoid-
able) requests on which it is based, i.e. that one can prepare microscopic
systems in precise states which are eigenstates of a quantum observable and
that when this is done and the considered observable is measured, one can get
reliable information about the eigenvalue of the observable itself, by appro-
priate amplification procedures leading to perceivably different macroscopic
situations of the universe.
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